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ABSTRACT:  The core function of organized crime is the selling of protection.   
Protection can be real, against third-party crime, or manufactured by the organized crime 
groups themselves.   Mafias and gangs emerge in areas of weak state control, because of 
prohibition and geographic, ethnic, or social isolation.  Although competition is 
considered good in economics, in the case of organized crime the predatory competition 
that is more likely to take place is harmful.  The costs of organized crime include the 
resources expended on the activity, more ordinary productive and investment distortions, 
as well as other dynamic effects on occupational choice. 
  
Keywords: Law and economics, property rights, governance 
JEL:  K00, K42, L10, L22, O17From highly sophisticated mafias to youth street gangs, organized crime is present in 
almost every country in the world. In addition to the better publicized Italian and 
American mafias
1, examples include the Yakuza in Japan, the Triads in Hong Kong, 
Shanghai’s Green Gang, Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, numerous groupings in 
post-Soviet states, youth gangs in Los Angeles, New York, Soweto, or Sao Paulo, as well 
as many other less well-known – even some, given the nature of the business, 
unknowable – groups. 
 
Organized crime engages in much regular economic activity, the production and 
distribution of a wide variety of goods and services that are typically both legal and 
illegal – from construction and restaurant services to drugs, gambling, and prostitution.  
For that reason we might be tempted to think that mafias and gangs are just like any 
typical business firm and are therefore subject to the same economic analysis that 
ordinary firms are.  However, the defining activity of an organized crime group -- in the 
absence of which its other activities could not take place at all or their nature would 
drastically change – is the provision of protection.  Protection is not an ordinary 
economic activity.  It is supposed to protect the ownership of other goods and services 
and make their contractual exchange enforceable. And, that enforceability does not come 
from the laws and courts – to which an ordinary security firm and its clients have access 
– but ultimately from the barrel of a mafioso’s gun.  The problem, of course, is that that 
gun can be turned not just against potential transgressors but also against those it is 
supposed to protect.  That is the peculiarity of protection and it makes organized crime 
groups less akin to ordinary business firms and more similar to the traditional provider of 
protection and security, the state.  However, the type of states that organized crime 
groups have similarities with are the early, proprietary, tribute-extracting, autocratic 
chiefdoms and states that are far removed from today’s modern states.  That is, it would 
be better to think of mafiosi as feudal lords than anything close to bureaucrats. 
 
                                                 
1 For the Italian mafias see Hess (1973), Arlacchi (1986), and Gambetta (1993), whereas for the American 
mafias see Reuter (1995) and Jacobs (1999).  For the Russian mafia and Japanese Yakuza see Varese 
(2001) and Hill (2006), respectively. We will first trace the origins of organized crime to conditions of anarchy, to power 
vacuums that are created by geography, political, social and ethnic distance, as well as 
legal vacuums that might be created by the prohibition of certain goods and services 
within modern states.  We will then discuss the hierarchical organization of organized 
crime and its market structure.  In particular, we will distinguish between two types of 
competition that may exist between organized groups that have very different 
implications for economic efficiency.  One type is ordinary economic competition in 
terms of the price and quality of the service that is provided which in this case, as just 
mentioned, is protection.  The other type of competition is predatory competition for turf 
among competing groups which has deleterious economics effects.  After discussing 
some consequence of organized crime, we conclude. 
   
I.  Origins of organized crime 
 
In a fundamental way, organized crime emerges in conditions that are antithetical to a 
main assumption of much of economic modeling: the perfect and costless enforcement of 
property rights.  If that assumption were to strictly hold, there would be no possibility for 
a mafioso to ask for protection money, for the potential victim could costlessly take the 
extortionist to court and win.  The mafioso can exist only when property rights are costly 
to enforce or imperfect.   The more costly and imperfect property rights enforcement is, 
the lower can be expected to be the efficacy of the State as manifested in its laws, courts, 
police, other government agencies. Organized crime is more likely to emerge then in 
conditions under which either the State is weak or when the State effectively cedes 
control by, for example, prohibiting certain activities that are then picked up by organized 
crime.  That is, organized crime is more likely to emerge in conditions that are close to 
anarchy (absence of rule) and there is a power vacuum.   
 
Simple geographic distance and inaccessibility from the centers of power is a main factor 
that reduces state authority.  No states have, or have had in the past, an absolute 
monopoly of the use of force within their territories.  In addition to ordinary crime, there 
are and have been areas within which it is too costly for state to extend direct control.  
Jungles, mountains, or deserts have thus been breeding grounds of brigandage and rebellions.  Geography then can play a role in creating a vacuum of power that can be 
filled by organizations that play the role of quasi-states.  The Amazon jungle, for 
example, has been a place in which Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, or Colombia has had difficulty 
extending their state power over their respective areas.  Private armies, ﬁnanced by 
landlords or drug traffickers, guerillas, and paramilitaries have been continually ﬁghting 
among themselves and, sometimes, against governments for control over territories.  
 
Another type of distance from the center of power that matters is that of ethnic and social 
distance.  American youth gangs have traditionally ﬂourished in low-income areas often 
populated by a homogeneous ethnic group – Irish, African-American, Hispanic. Many 
residents of such areas typically have viewed themselves as being apart and discriminated 
by the larger society (See Jankowski, 1991). The police and the justice system have also 
been often viewed at best as indifferent to their welfare and at worst as agents of 
repression. Therefore, ordinary crime becomes difficult to control in such areas, and 
gangs step in to ﬁll the gap that is created, but also further contribute to violence in a 
more organized fashion. The townships of apartheid South Africa were perhaps extreme 
examples of alienation of a population from state authorities and, unsurprisingly, the 
levels of insecurity and violence there had been extremely high (see, e.g., Carver, 1992). 
The same broad process may be occurring in European cities, where the conditions are 
ripe in areas with high unemployment or concentrated poor immigrant groups that may 
feel alienated from the larger society.   However, that type of alienation can carry over to 
ordinary, adult organized crime, where a whole ethnic group like the Chechens in Russia 
is both stigmatized and identifies by the larger society with organized crime (see Lieven, 
1998)  
 
A power vacuum can also be created by revolutions, wars, and major political change. 
With the previous political authority and institutions gone and new effective ones 
typically taking time to develop, there can be long periods of time during which people 
can face basic physical insecurity in addition to more complex problems of uncertainty 
and insecurity of contract enforcement. It is perhaps then no accident that the Sicilian 
Maﬁa grew signiﬁcantly during the years immediately following the uniﬁcation of Italy 
in an area that was previously under authoritarian rule for many centuries and in which republican institutions were unfamiliar compared to other parts of Italy.  For the former 
Soviet Union, it has been argued (Solnick, 1998) that the power vacuum preceded its 
break-up and was actually the precipitating cause of the break-up itself. Bureaucratic 
control weakened considerably over the years, with individual bureaucrats or coalitions 
of them seizing control of the organizational assets they were supposed to be managing. 
Actually, the word ’maﬁya’ was used to describe the networks of corruption lurking 
inside regional and central ministries (Handelman, 1994). There appears to be some 
continuity in membership in these old Soviet-era maﬁyas and the maﬁas and gangs of the 
post-Soviet world.  
 
Thus far we have considered potential sources of State weakness that can contribute to 
the development of organized crime.  However, the State itself can create such conditions 
by effectively ceding control of contract enforcement through the prohibition of 
production and distribution of certain goods and services.  Drugs, prostitution, alcohol, 
arms, gambling have been important areas of action for mafias and gangs.  Exclusive 
government monopolies in the sale of salt, matches, or tobacco in the past have also 
invited smuggling and protection by organized crime groups.  More recently, human 
trafficking across international borders has become a lucrative business for many 
organized groups.  The distribution of nuclear material or even of nuclear weapons by 
such groups could not be ruled in the present or future. 
 
When the production and sale of a good or a service is prohibited, and there is reasonable 
demand at high prices as there is for drugs, some demand is bound to be ﬁlled at high 
prices. Along the supply chain from primary producer to ﬁnal consumer, however, there 
are a host of contractual enforcement and ﬁnancing problems that have to be solved 
without recourse to the police, the legal system, or to mainstream ﬁnancial institutions. 
That is, with prohibition private parties cannot write and enforce contracts through the 
normal legal channels, and thus an effective power vacuum is created around the 
production, distribution, and ﬁnancing of the prohibited commodity and its inputs.     
Cocaine is an example of a prohibited commodity for which there is a multiplicity and 
variety of contractual enforcement problems that exist along its supply chain (see 
Clawson and Lee, 1998).  These problems cannot be solved realistically through each individual agent along this chain just taking their own defensive and private enforcement 
measures. The conditions cry for an ultimate enforcer, a “hegemon,” at least over 
substantial parts of the supply chain. The reasons for such an arrangement are similar to 
those that make states have the notional, if not always the de facto, monopoly of 
enforcement within their territories. For now, we could compactly characterize the 
rationale for a single enforcer within a certain area as being due to “increasing returns” in 
enforcement. 
 
We would like to stress at this point that drugs or any other economic activity of 
organized crime cannot exist without providing protection and enforcement, whereas 
organized crime groups can exist solely by providing protection and not engaging in 
other activities. This is similar to the customary Weberian deﬁnition of the state as the 
monopolist in the use of force, despite the fact that states do a lot more than providing 
internal and external security.  
 
II.  Internal organization 
 
Organized crime groups are typically hierarchically organizations. Whereas some youth 
gangs, like Chicano gangs in East Los Angeles have a ﬂat organizational structure with 
leadership that is only informally recognized, others, like many New York gangs, have a 
formal hierarchical structure with considerable differentiation of duties among its 
members (Jankowski, 1991, Ch.3).  The Sicilian Maﬁa is hierarchically organized and 
that is recognized to be so through formal procedures (Gambetta, 1993, Ch.5). 
 
Although precise knowledge of the internal functions of most organized groups is hard to 
come by, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) were able to obtain detailed information on the 
organization and finances of a Chicago drug-selling gang.  According to Levitt and 
Venkatesh, there was a core group at the top of the organization concerned with long-
term strategy and for maintaining a relationship with drug suppliers and other affiliates.  
At the next level of the hierarchy are local leaders who hire an enforcer, a treasurer and a 
runner whose job is to run risky tasks.  The enforcers recruit foot soldiers (between 
twenty five and seventy five who serve as street-level drug sellers.  The functioning of 
the organization is similar to that of a franchised company.  The local leaders receives drug supplies through the central leadership, and pay a fee and receive protection against 
law enforcement and rival gangster the central leaders obtain drug supplies from the 
central leadership. 
 
Since, as argued in the previous section, maﬁas and gangs emerge out of a power vacuum 
to provide protection, why don’t those who need the protection band together as equals in 
a “social contract” and provide the needed protection themselves? Why do they have to 
pay up a maﬁoso who may actually artiﬁcially create his own demand and extort more 
than it would cost each one in the group of equals if they were to band together?  In 
principle, for example, the shopkeepers and residents within a few city blocks could 
agree to form community policing groups against common crime.  They could create 
patrols of residents and shopkeepers. Whereas this practice could occur in certain cases, 
too often the maﬁas prevail.  Forming such self-governing protection groups involves 
substantial coordination costs and as group size increases the free-rider problem becomes 
more serious. These problems can be overcome with a small enough group of residents 
and shopkeepers who know one another. However, the main problem in such groups 
forming and surviving appears to be the presence of powerful maﬁas around that are 
looking to expand their protection rents as well as their other business. It is one thing to 
have community policing against common theft. It is an entirely different matter to have 
the same residents and shopkeepers to go into battle against the heavily armed deputies of 
Al Capone. Thus, residents and shopkeepers succumb.  They pay up, and smile, wave, 
and chat to their local protector. They are the only one they have and they’d better keep 
them happy.  
 
For someone to become a member of such an organization, it will be necessary to have at 
least once applied force decisively against opponents or, as it can happen with youth 
gangs, against members of the organization itself. That is, maﬁosi and gang members 
need to demonstrate the ability to use force and have sufﬁcient ruthlessness in using it. 
Naturally, then, members of organized crime groups tend to be recruited from those who 
have a certain comparative advantage in violence. (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000, report an 
annual death rate in their data sample of 7%, a number which is shockingly high.)  Once 
someone is within the organization, however, it is unclear whether greater capacity and predisposition for violence can help much more for advancement within the hierarchy. 
Other skills become important at the higher echelons: the ability to plan and execute 
tasks, sophisticated political and administrative skills, or how well you can motivate 
those who work for you. These are skills that are necessary in any other organization.  
 
As with ordinary organizations, motivating the employees is a critical determinant of an 
organization’s success. Inculcating loyalty and pride in work is a concern of virtually all 
organizations. Abiding by norms and informal constraints reduces inﬁghting and other 
transaction costs within the organization. (Part of the discussion that follows also draws 
from Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1995). It is likewise with gangs and maﬁas, as they 
appear to develop and articulate cultures and ideologies, systems of beliefs about the 
world that have a certain internal logic that, at least outwardly, all its members appear to 
subscribe.  A core element of the ideology of many American youth gangs (Jankowski, 
1991, Ch.3) is that American society systematically discriminates against their kind. 
Nearly all gangs believe that their ethnic group has been denied access to conventional 
opportunities that would allow them to live better lives. Their members subscribe to a 
social Darwinist perspective according to which predatory behavior is how one gets 
ahead everywhere in society. The gang, then, contributes to the advancement of its 
members and their ethnic group, just as the more powerful networks contribute to the 
welfare of their own members in the larger society. With such a worldview, the activities 
of the gang that are considered reprehensible in the mainstream are thus rationalized by 
gang members. The poverty of their surroundings and the hostility of media and 
authorities help reinforce such beliefs.  
 
The main job of the maﬁoso is not much different from that of the feudal knight: he 
provides protection or, to put it more respectably, security. In rural Sicily the maﬁoso 
used to perform straightforward intermediary and judicial functions that were conferring 
legitimacy from the community. It is therefore not surprising that the traditional Sicilian 
maﬁoso’s self image even in cases of acts of extreme brutality was that of a “sacriﬁce 
which he makes for the beneﬁt of the public weal” (Hess, 1973, p. 68) – like killing in 
times of war, it’s a dirty job but it has to be done for the overall beneﬁt.  
 Similarly, whether out of genuine conviction, guilt, or narrow self-interest, many major 
organized crime ﬁgures have also been involved in charity and public service. The leader 
of the Shanghai Green Gang, Du Yuesheng, became a major community leader and 
philanthropist (Martin, 1996). Pablo Escobar (of the Colombian Medellin cartel) and his 
associates donated several hundred new homes to poor slum dwellers of Medellin and 
constructed some eighty illuminated sports arenas in the area. Articles in the local 
newspaper – directed by Escobar’s uncle – contrasted Escobar’s public spirit with the 
indifference of other businessmen and of the Colombian political establishment at large 
(Clawson and Lee, 1998, p. 48). Genuine propaganda or not, the outward projection of 
the provider-of-public-good image is often an important component of organizations that 
have matured enough to compete with the state itself.  In the case of Escobar the gambit 
did not succeed as he was killed in a highly-publicized government raid – perhaps he 
should have been as conciliatory with the Colombian state as he was with the Medellin 
area. For the Sicilian Maﬁa, however, the adaptation of seeing itself as a public servant 
worked reasonably well for more than a century. 
III.  Market structure: two types of competition 
 
Since organized crime yields profits both from protection activities and from the 
production and distribution of goods and services, we could expect potential new entrants 
who would attempt to gain a slice of the business from existing groups.   New entrants 
could be deterred by existing groups in two broad ways.  One is the regular way, 
available to legitimate business firms, of lowering price, enhancing quality and other 
measures that could keep existing and new customers happy.  Organized crime groups, 
however, have another way of competing with one another that is not typically available 
to ordinary business firms:  They can “knee-cap” – or mete out worse punishments than 
that to -- customers and competitors alike, so as they can compel them to do what they 
want them to do, without having to change price or quality.  We discuss these two types 
of competition next. 
 
For the first type of competition, the organized crime group can be thought of as 
providing protection to customers – say shopkeepers in their area -- against crime in exchange for a fee.  (For models of this type of competition, see Grossman, 1995, and 
Dixit, 2004.)  The protection service provided can vary in terms of quantity and quality:  
how often the group checks on the shop, how much knowledge (“intelligence”) they have 
of the local potential thieves, what other measures they undertake to prevent theft, what 
they do in terms of restitution to the victim if theft were to take place, and so on.  The 
higher the level of the protection service, the higher the cost to the organized groups can 
be expected to be.  Then, a group that tries to maximize profits would like to receive the 
highest possible fee from a shopkeeper for delivering service while incurring minimum 
cost. 
 
An organized crime group – according to this approach -- could be considered as offering 
packages of protection services that come with different prices or fees, one of which 
could be accepted by the shopkeeper.  When the organized group has a monopoly in the 
area, it offers a protection service-price package that maximizes its own profit subject to 
the condition that is just (barely) acceptable to the shopkeeper.   That is, a monopolistic 
group would receive almost all the surplus from providing the protection service to the 
shopkeeper.  If we were to include more than one shopkeeper, the monopolistic organized 
crime group could either offer one level of service at a given price to all shopkeepers with 
some of them accepting the package and others not, or it could price-discriminate and 
offer dedicated packages to each shopkeeper that is just accepted by every shopkeeper.  
In either case, according to standard economic theory either outcome would be 
economically inefficient, because in the first case the price is too high and the level of 
protection too low whereas in the second case different customers face different prices. 
 
If, however, a competitor were to enter the “market” for protection services, the original 
monopolist would be forced to reduce price and increase the level of protection services 
offered (see Grossman, 1995, for the particular mechanics) and thus increase economic 
efficiency.  As with other similar economic models of competition, the greater the 
number of competitors, the higher is the level of efficiency.  The shopkeepers would need 
to pay less and the protection services they would receive would be higher, the higher is 
the number of organized crime groups competing for providing the service.  
The type of model just outlined fits well the private security services industry, an industry 
that has expanded significantly in the US and elsewhere over the past two decades.   
Applying the same model, though, to organized crime involves the adoption of at least 
two assumptions that are empirically difficult to fulfill.  The first assumption is that 
organized crime groups cannot take extra-legal measures like creating their own demand 
for protection services.  Ordinary security firms do not typically go threatening their 
potential customers with burning down their shop if they do not buy protection services 
from them.  Mafiosi can, and are known to make, such threats and sometimes carry them 
through.  A shopkeeper can take a legitimate security firm to court for making such 
threats and the firm will have to pay lawyer’s bills and possibly face sanctions as a result.  
A shopkeeper could theoretically take a mafioso to court but the mafioso has additional 
extra-legal means to respond: ransacking the shop, burning it down, physically 
threatening the shopkeeper and his family.  The second assumption of the model outlined 
above is that competitors cannot take extra-legal measures against one another so as to 
prevent competition.  Organized groups, however, typically try to keep one another out of 
their respective turfs.  Some famous movie films have been made out of mafia wars, but 
such turf battles are real and central to the survival and profitability of organized crime 
groups.  With organized crime groups having a typically geographically non-overlapping 
potential clientele, the price and service competition we have outlined above effectively 
could not take place. 
 
That leads us to the second type of competition that is possible among organized crime 
groups, and it is precisely the one that involves competition for turf, an area within which 
a group has a near-monopoly in the use of force.   This type of resembles more the 
competition among the lords, kings, and emperors that had been taking place for most of 
human history since the agricultural revolution. It takes the form of an arms race with 
your neighbors. If you have a large enough army you can deter your neighbors or take 
some of their turf; if not, you lose turf or you can be taken over completely. The market 
structure that could best describe organized crime, then, is a curious sort of monopolistic 
competition, whereby each gang has the local monopoly of protection within a certain area and this local monopoly is maintained by the gang’s capability of mobilizing and 
using force against other gangs. The absence of alternative providers of protection locally 
implies that the gang can use its enforcement powers internally to extract a price for its 
protection that is not just at its monopoly level but is extortionist – the gang can name its 
price and its quantity especially if the gang’s time horizon is short or the area’s 
population does not have the resources to move in areas without gangs.  
 
With proﬁt maximization and free entry, in the long run we should expect the proﬁts of 
gangs and maﬁas to be reduced to those available elsewhere in the economy. Does the 
greater competition that comes with free entry and the absence of excess proﬁts imply a 
better economic outcome though, as it does in the case of the first type of competition? 
The answer is different here. Remember that competition takes place through resources 
devoted to ﬁghting that then become unavailable for production. Therefore, greater 
competition implies that more resources are used on ﬁghting and fewer are used in 
production. Hence greater competition in the protection business reduces total production 
and efﬁciency.
2  If cooperation or consolidation among gangs could occur, economic 
efﬁciency would in principle be enhanced as fewer resources could be devoted to 
predation. However, it is doubtful how much of the saving in costs would be passed 
down to the community in the areas controlled by the cooperating gangs. And, as the 
institutional safeguards for cooperation are weak – often based on personalized 
leadership that breaks down when a leader disappears from the scene – there is an 
inherent unpredictability and instability in the world of organized crime.  
 
IV.  Some Economic Consequences 
 
We have just discussed some of the effects of competition among organized crime 
groups. Whereas for the first type of competition, more competition induces lower 
economic costs (or, higher efficiency), the second type of competition induces greater 
economic costs when there is more of it.  It is important to be clear analytically about the 
type of inefﬁciency that is identiﬁed in that second type of competition, and as we have 
argued more empirically relevant one for organized crime. It is not the allocative 
                                                 
2  For models of this type of competition, see Konrad and Skaperdas (2006) and Skaperdas (2001). inefﬁciency that exists because of the suboptimal, but productive, employment of factors 
of production, although that can occur too. What has been discussed is the unproductive 
employment of economic resources that could be used elsewhere for directly productive 
purposes, in what has been variously labeled “appropriative,” “redistributive,” 
“conﬂictual,” or “predatory” activities. 
 
Gang and maﬁa members spend their time 
making their presence felt in the neighborhood, defending against one another, and 
preparing to ﬁght one another. Guns, locks, and steel bars also fall into this category of 
activities. They can be considered to contribute to security in an indirect way, but the 
same amount of security is compatible with many different levels of expenditures on such 
appropriative activities. Intense competition of many gangs can involve the expenditure 
of a lot more resources than complete hegemonic domination by one large maﬁa, and 
which in turn can involve the expenditure of a lot more resources than those of a modern 
state with an effective police and judicial system.  
 
Although the loss of efficiency due to appropriation in areas with organized crime can be 
substantial, the spillover effects organized crime has on regular economic activity can be 
even higher. Legal businesses that have to pay for protection face higher costs of 
operation, invest less and bias the investments they make against anything that can be 
easily destroyed (Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998). For the same businesses, regular 
contracting through the mainstream legal system can become difﬁcult even if it concerns 
perfectly legal matters, since the maﬁa can intentionally and actively discourage recourse 
to the legal system as it represents a challenge to its authority and a reduction to the 
rationale for its existence. There can be substitute contracting and other informal 
constraints, of course, as the maﬁa provides protection after all and has substantial 
enforcement powers within its area.  In fact, the maﬁa could enforce contracts more 
effectively than the state can because it can impose penalties that are much more severe;  
for example, physical punishment and even death. However, the arbitrariness that 
typically accompanies such penalties and the multitude of uncertainties that surround 
contract fulﬁllment in a maﬁa’s territory are unlikely to be outweighed by the severity of 
penalties the maﬁa can impose. As a result of the multiple uncertainties and incomplete 
information that exists, violence, destruction of property, and death are more likely to occur in organized crime territory.
3
The long-term effects of organized crime could be even more devastating than its 
immediate, static effects. The area’s most able, entrepreneurial, and responsible youth 
can choose to become maﬁosi and gangbangers, as Jankowski (1991, Ch.4) argues to be 
the case in American inner cities. Those are precisely the individuals who under different 
circumstances would provide very different types of community support and leadership. 
Once human beings develop human capital expertise in one area, it is very costly for 
them to change later in life. Former guerillas, demobilized soldiers after wars, and gang 
members have difﬁculties adapting to conventional lives and occupations later in life. 
Many ﬁnd brigandage, robbery, or reversion to organized crime a familiar and more 
proﬁtable lifestyle than its alternatives. Even after the destruction of organized crime in 
an area, it can take more than a generation before normalcy prevails. 
 
  In summary, the costs of organized crime include the resources expended on 
appropriation and predation, instead of production; various more conventional productive 
and investment distortions; the contractual problems that develop outside the realm of 
modern governance; and the incentives for the development of human skills that are 
biased towards appropriation instead of towards production. 
 
Potential criminals, like any individuals, can be considered as rational as in any other 
economics setting.  They compare the benefits with the expected costs of committing a 
crime.   Then, a society can deter crime by making illegitimate activities costlier. To 
achieve this, a society typically increases the probability of crime detection and the 
severity of associated punishment which results in an increase in the cost associated with 
crime.  An organized crime group is able to coordinate all its members’ activities and, as 
a consequence, crimes committed by them become difficult to detect.
4 They are also able 
to protect their members against potential punishment by bribing government officials, 
                                                 
3 Bester and Warneryd (2006) show how open conﬂict can be an equilibrium phenomenon in a model 
with appropriation, whereas Garoupa (2000) and Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) show how violence is 
possible as a result of credibility problems in the business of organized crime.  
 
4 See Garoupa (2007) for intra-organizational view of organized crime.  
 threatening potential witnesses, and, in some cases, employing violence against judges 
and magistrates. The top echelon members of organized crime groups are further 
removed from direct crime and thus enjoy virtual immunity from the negative 
consequences of crimes they perpetrate. Not surprisingly, there have been only a few 
successful campaigns in the past against organized crime groups. 
 
In the US, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization act or RICO as is 
commonly know has been the most effective tool against crimes committed by organized 
crime groups.  The act lists various activities (such as extortion, bribery, loan sharking, 
illegal drug sales, prostitution, or murder), relaxes the definition of conspiracy, and 
provides penalties for criminal acts performed as a part of an ongoing criminal 
organization. The act focuses on the patterns of criminal acts as opposed to individual 
crimes. Thus, under RICO, the head of a crime organization can be prosecuted even if he 
has never been personally engaged in any criminal activity. The punishments under 
RICO can be exceptionally harsh. Apart from a long prison sentence, a convicted person 
forfeits all interests and claims over the criminal enterprise, as well as over the property 
that constitutes the racketeering activity or what was obtained from the racketeering 
activity. Further, RICO allows the victims of organized crime to recover from the 
convicted person in civil court. The RICO is designed, first to make detection of criminal 
enterprises easier and ultimately to cripple and eradicate organized crime enterprises. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite all the technological improvements, economic growth, and expansion of the 
scope of governments over the past two centuries, organized crime is present even in the 
richest of countries.  Evidently there are still cracks in the power of modern states that are 
created not just by the prohibition of commodities like drugs but also by cleavages of 
ethnicity, race, and class that modern societies still have.  As long as these cracks exist 
that create local power vacuums, organized crime will continue to emerge to fill them.  
Well-publicized attempts to dislodge or eliminate organized crime are not likely to be 
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